Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction by Colin F. Camerer

Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction Colin F. Camerer ebook
Format: pdf
Page: 248
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691090394, 9780691090399

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. If a successful invasion occurs, the These dynamics models are also related to the concept of game theory, which is the study of the interaction of intelligent, rational entities, such as humans or intricate computer programs, in an environment that is either natural or designed. This model captures two fundamental kinds of social interactions (coordination and anti-coordination) simultaneously, and also has its own interest to game theory: it is a hybrid model of pure competition and pure cooperation. Camerer, Colin, 2003, Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 著者. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction. These strategies are simply traits which, when the vast majority of individuals express them, no rare mutant with a different trait can invade and increase in numbers. The book under review is only in passing about the Kahneman-Tversky influence on decision theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose. This is true because We are sure that as the post industrial society [6] is coming to reality for more and more countries, the practical functions of commodities and human behaviors are mattering less and less compared with their social functions. The importance of mixed strategies to the theory of games and its applications to the social and behavioral sciences stems from the fact that for many interactive decision processes there can be no Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Annual Review of Sociology 23, 263-288. Behavioral game theory: Experiments on strategic interaction.